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We aimed to address the long-standing issue of the nature of the relationships that
link a cue word to words associated with it. In keeping with a recently proposed
neuropsychological model of semantic memory (Zannino et al., 2015), we provide
support for the hypothesis that associative links are semantic in nature and not lexical.
In support of this hypothesis, we demonstrate a relationship in healthy subjects between
the probability of producing word X in response to cue word Y in a free association task
and the probability of using word X to describe the meaning of word Y. Furthermore,
we provide evidence that associative measures are altered in people suffering from
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and predict their level of performance in a picture-naming
task. We provide a parsimonious account of the experimental data gathered form these
different sources of evidence according to the hypothesis that the links between a cue
word and its associates can be viewed as binding a concept (the cue) to pieces of
information regarding its meaning (the associates).
Keywords: semantic memory impairment, semantic memory models, Alzheimer’s disease, free association,
semantic priming
INTRODUCTION
The word association technique first used by Galton (1879) consists of letting subjects respond to a
cue word with the first word that comes tomind. After more than a century since this technique was
first adopted, the nature of the relationship between a cue word and its associates is still a matter of
debate. In the present work we propose (and provide empirical evidence in favor of) the hypothesis
that the links between a cue word and its associates can be viewed as binding a concept (the cue) to
pieces of information regarding its meaning (the associates).
A long standing neuropsychological tradition, which dates back to nineteenth century
associationism, clearly refutes this view. This persistent skepticism about the role of language
in shaping concepts’ boundaries is shared by exponents of the two most influential approaches
to semantic memory: the amodal approach and the embodied cognition approach (see Barsalou
et al., 2003; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008, for critical reviews of these contrasting approaches). In
keeping with the divergent assumptions underlying these approaches, the reasons for depriving
language of semantic relevance are somewhat opposite in the amodal and embodied cognition
factions. Sustainers of the former approach consider semantics as something represented in a much
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more abstract format than language, which in turn is considered
one of several modality-specific sources of information about
things in the world (see for example the hub-and-spoke model,
Rogers et al., 2004; Patterson et al., 2007). By contrast sustainers
of embodied cognition consider semantics as something much
more concrete than language. In fact, in this view purely verbal
tasks are independent from action and perception and semantic
processing relies on the re-enactment of the same sensorimotor
representations that become active during interaction with
objects in the world (Barsalou, 1999).
In amodal approaches to semantic memory, the idea that
associative links between words have nothing to do with
semantics is clearly put forward by Fodor in his very influential
essay on the modularity of mind (Fodor, 1983). In line with the
2 fold assumption that first the language recognition system is
informationally encapsulated (i.e., it is insensitive to information
specified outside of it) and second that semantic information
is represented outside the language recognition system, Fodor
argued in favor of the conclusion that although word recognition
is known to be speeded up when words are placed in a coherent
sentential context, semantic information is nevertheless not
useful in guiding lexical access. In his view, if the sentential
context, “I have the pepper but would you please pass the
___” speeds up response to the target word “salt” in a lexical
decision (consisting of letting subjects decide if a letter string
is or is not a real word), this occurs through the connections
between the lexical nodes “pepper” and “salt” (the lexicon is
of course represented within the language recognition system)
and not because the language recognition system has access to
the (semantic) knowledge that pepper and salt are currently
used together to dress food. According to Fodor, if the language
recognition system is able to behave as if it were using semantic
knowledge, this is because “terms for things frequently connected
in experience become themselves connected in the lexicon” (pp.
81–82). In other words, in the modular language recognition
system lexical associations mimic semantic relationships outside
this system, but (associative) relations between words are not
primarily semantic.
Coming to the embodied cognition approach, Barsalou and
colleagues are among the most explicit in considering word
association a non-semantic phenomenon (Santos et al., 2011).
According to these authors, lexical association reveals links
between words but not between concepts because responding to
a cue word with the first word that comes to mind is a task that
does not rely on “situated simulation,” i.e., on the re-enactment
of previous experiences with referents of the involved words (to
respond “cat” to the cue word “dog” there is no need to imagine
a scene involving cats and dogs). Since re-enactment of patterns
of neural activity experienced during interaction with things in
the world is the very basis of our semantic knowledge, the link
between a cue word and its first associate cannot be semantic in
nature.
This widespread disbelief that word association is a semantic
phenomenon is reflected in the vast debate on the semantic vs.
associative nature of word-word priming.
The paradigm of word-word priming is very similar to that
of contextual facilitation discussed by Fodor (1983, see above).
It consists of the reduction of reaction times in responding to
a target word when it is preceded by a related prime word
compared to an unrelated prime word. Thus, for example,
deciding if a given target is a real word or a non-word (i.e., a
lexical decision task) requires shorter reaction times if the target
word “dog” is preceded by the prime word “cat” than by the
unrelated word “chair.” An enduring issue is whether the priming
effect observed in related pairs relies on their semantic or their
lexical relationship.
Assuming, in keeping with Fodor (see above), that associative
links rely on the co-occurence of words in texts, Lucas (2000)
carried out a meta-analytic review of the priming literature to
ascertain whether “there is a boost in priming from adding
an associative relationship to an existing semantic one” (p.
619). This author found empirical support for this hypothesis;
however, she concluded her review of the literature with the
somewhat puzzling caveat: “Whether this associative boost is due
to a particularly strong semantic relationship among associated
words or to the addition of a co-occurrence relationship
remains unclear” (p.627). Indeed, this statement sounds like an
acknowledgment that word association might reveal the strength
of semantic links rather than the presence of lexical relationships.
This argument was further developed by Hutchison (2003, see
also Moss et al., 1995) who observed that most associated pairs
are linked by an evident semantic relationship, but not necessarily
one based on featural overlap; this holds for coordinate concepts
(thus, for example, the dog concept is semantically related to
the cat concept because both dogs and cats <have fur>, <are
animals>, <live in homes> and so on) but also pairs like
hammer and nail are clearly semantically related. Thus, although
it is possible to find two members of a common semantic
category that are not listed in associative norms (e.g., “pig”
and “horse”), it is hardly possible to find associative pairs that
do not have some kind of semantic relationship. As Hutchison
(2003) reports, the vast majority of associated pairs listed in
Palermo and Jenkins’ (1964) norms are terms that are either
characterized by featural overlap (like the following cue/associate
pairs: synonymic, afraid/scared; superordinate, dog/animal;
coordinate, sheep/goat) or by a concept-feature relationship
(referring either to perceptual properties, e.g., canary/yellow, or
functional ones, e.g., broom/sweep). By contrast, purely phrasal
associates (baby/boy) represent a minority type.
In a recent paper (Zannino et al., 2015) we criticized the
marginal role assigned to language in semantic memory by most
current neuropsychological models and argued in favor of an
alternative approach to conceptual knowledge that stresses the
prominent role of words in shaping the boundaries of concepts.
The present work focuses on the nature of associative links with
the more general aim of acknowledging the role of language
in conceptual knowledge. To this end, we attempt to provide
empirical support for the hypothesis of the semantic nature of
the links between associated words. In particular, as stated at the
beginning of this introduction, we hold that words which are
associated with a given cue represent bits of information that
belong to the semantic representation of the cue word. It is well-
known from associative norms that some cue words elicit the
same few associates across all participants (These cue/associate
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pairs are said to have high associative strength) whereas other
words elicit many associates, each of which is produced by only
a few participants (These cue/associate pairs are said to have
low associative strength). In fact, if we admit that to perform
word association tasks participants can rely on either their
idiosyncratic experience (a subject could respond “blood” to
the cue word “glass” because he/she cut his/her finger with a
broken glass the day before) or to more widely shared knowledge
(probably at work in associations like “umbrella”/”rain”), then
we will also be willing to believe that high dominant associates
(i.e., responses produced by most participants to a given cue)
rely on shared knowledge whereas low dominant associates rely
on idiosyncratic personal experiences. Going a step further, we
argue that the shared knowledge ground, where high dominant
associates come from, is in fact the semantic knowledge shared
by the speakers of a given natural language. In this view,
non-idiosyncratic word associates represent pieces of semantic
information about the cue word and cues having a high
associative agreement (AAG), i.e., that elicit only a few associates
with high associative strength, are likely to have a core meaning
that is widely agreed upon among the speakers of a given natural
language. Alternatively one could believe that participants in
associative norms studies retrieve non-idiosyncratic associates
from a common ground of lexical knowledge shared across
the speakers of a given natural language. In this view, high
associative agreement would rely on some lexical (as opposed
to semantic) characteristics of the cue word. The lexical and
semantic hypotheses about the nature of the associative links
between words make several different predictions that we will
attempt to empirically verify in the present study.
First, if, as we maintain, non-idiosyncratic associated words
express semantic features of the cue, then the associative strength
of a given cue/associate pair can be considered a measure of
between subject agreement about the presence of a given feature
in the meaning of a given cue word. Thus, based on our
assumption there should be a relationship between associative
strength and the presence of associated words in the definition
of the cue word. Thus, for example, because the word pair
“umbrella”/“rain” has high associative strength, the occurrence
of “rain” should be high in the definitions of “umbrella” provided
by a sample of subjects. To verify this prediction, we let healthy
participants define concrete words for which we had previously
collected associative norms and looked for a correlation between
strength of the cue/associate link and frequency of occurrence
of the associate in the cue word definitions produced by our
subjects.
A second prediction regards the role of AAG in predicting
performance on semantic tasks. We reasoned that if high AAG
suggests the presence of a widely agreed upon core meaning
it is arguable that it also predicts ease of processing of single
words meanings. In tasks like picture naming a picture must be
semantically interpreted in order to have access to the lexical label
of the corresponding word (Humphreys et al., 1988; Alario et al.,
2004). Thus, pictures corresponding to words with high AAG
are expected to be easier to name than pictures corresponding
to words with low AAG, particularly for subjects with reduced
semantic resources. To verify this prediction, we enrolled a
sample of subjects with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) because the
impairment of semantic memory is well documented in this
population (see below). Participants with AD were asked to
complete a picture naming task involving the same words for
which AAG norms were previously collected in a sample of
healthy subjects. Naming data were analyzed to search for a
relationship between AAG and naming accuracy in the AD
group.
Finally, if associative links are semantic in nature, it is expected
that people with impaired semantic knowledge should exhibit
alteredmeasures of associative strength. To verify this hypothesis,
the AD sample and a healthy control group were submitted to
a free association task. Values of associative strength between
cue and associated words were computed and compared across
groups.
We chose to enroll AD patients to verify predictions two and
three because there is a general agreement regarding the presence
of a semantic impairment in AD (Hodges et al., 1991; Salmon
et al., 1999; Chertkow et al., 2008; Cuetos et al., 2012; Zannino
et al., 2015). It should be noted, however, that some authors
maintain that in addition to the semantic deficit some degree
of lexical impairment might also affect language performances
in this population (Cuetos et al., 2012). This suggests caution
in interpreting our findings. Nevertheless, as discussed below,
we believe that the evidence gathered in this study provides
strong support in favor of the hypothesis that associative links
are semantic nature.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Norms of associative strength and AAG were collected in a set
of 35 cue words. The same 35 items were then used to devise
the three experiments included in this study: (i) written word
definition, (ii) picture naming, and (iii) free association. This
allowed us to verify the three predictions we argue are in keeping
with the semantic nature of associative links: (i) the presence of
a relationship between the associative strength of an associated
word and its frequency of occurrence in the definition of the cue
word; (ii) the ability of AAG to predict AD naming performance;
and, (iii) the presence of altered associative links in AD.
Collection of Associative Norms
Subjects
To obtain normative data we enrolled two samples of healthy
subjects. The first sample comprised 20 participants (half male
and half female, mean age = 32.7, SD = 14.44 range = 25–60
years). The second comprised 52 healthy subjects (26 females, 26
males) over 65 years of age (mean age = 72.9, SD = 7.01, range
= 65–89) who were matched for age with the AD sample. The
smaller subject sample (n = 20) was enrolled in a pilot study
aimed at selecting the items on which normative data were then
collected in the larger sample (n= 52).
Measures
In order to verify our predictions we needed two indices of
associative relationships computed on the same 35 words that
were included in the experimental tasks, i.e., a measure of
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associative strength related to cue/associated pairs and a measure
of AAG related to single cue words. To quantify the relationship
between cue and associate we used, as is customary, the
Forward Associative Strength (FSG) measure, which expresses
the proportion of subjects responding with a given associate to a
given cue. The index regarding the associative agreement (AAG)
of single cue words was devised for the purposes of this study.
To compute it, we borrowed a metric, the H statistic, which
is widely used to compute name agreement, i.e., the degree to
which subjects are consistent in producing a word for a specific
picture in a confrontation naming task. The 35-cue words set
with corresponding H-index AAG is reported in Appendix. The
H metric was first used by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) for
quantifying name agreement and is still the most widely used
measure for this purpose (see for example Janssen et al., 2011).
From a statistical point of view, the problem of quantifying cross-
subject consistency in producing associates and the problem of
measuring name agreement are superimposable; thus, we argued
that recourse to a well-known metric for our new associative
variable was preferable.
As is common practice, we computed H using the following
equation:
H =
k∑
i= 1
pi log 2(
1
pi
)
where k is the number of different associates produced for a given
cue word and p denotes the proportion of subjects producing a
given associated word (i.e., the FSG for that cue/associate pair).
It should be stressed that apart from the fact that AAG applies
to single cue words, whereas FSG applies to cue/associate pairs,
the relationship between the two variables is very strong; in fact
(see the above reported equation), in order to quantify AAG
of a given cue word we used the FSG values of all the word
pairs formed by that cue and its associates; moreover, the FSG
between a cue and one of its associates expresses the degree
of agreement on this pair among the subjects comprising the
normative sample.
Item Selection
The goal of the selection procedure was to find 35 concrete, easily
depictable words that were likely to span from an intermediate
to a high level of AAG in normative data collected in a group
of 52 elderly Italian controls who were age matched to the AD
sample enrolled in the experimental tasks (see section Norms
Collection). This range of AAG was desirable in order to discard
idiosyncratic associations and still obtain enough variability for
our variable of interest. The selection procedure comprised two
steps: a search among existing associative norms and a pilot study
enrolling a small sample of 20 healthy subjects. In the first step,
a large corpus of 107 concrete and easily depictable words was
taken from existing associative norms by selecting those cues for
which the cumulative FSG of the three most associated words
was above 50% in one or more of the searched norms (This
was done to discard cues with low AAG). Due to the scarcity
of large normative databases for the Italian language, we also
used norms collected for other European languages (Ferrand and
Alario, 1998; Peressotti et al., 2002; Fernandez et al., 2004; Nelson
et al., 2004; De Deyne and Storms, 2008). In a second step, the
corpus of 107 words was administered for free association to a
sample 20 subjects and FSG was computed for each cue word.
Each participant performed the free association task individually
in a single session. The subject was instructed to respond as fast as
possible with the first word that came to mind. The experimenter
read the cue word aloud and recorded the response. From the
above described database we selected the 35 cue words to be used
for the collection of associative norms in a larger sample of 52
healthy elderly subjects. To be included in the final set of cue
words, items had to meet the following criteria: (i) in the pilot
study, they had to have obtained a cumulative FSG > 50% on the
three most associated words; (ii) they shared no associates with
the other cue words included in the final set of 35 cues; (iii) none
of the other 34 cue words were included among their associates;
(iv) no words co-occurring with the cue in Italian proverbs
or idiomatic expressions were included among their associates.
Furthermore, in selecting the 35 final items, particular care
was taken to select words whose pictorial representations were
likely to produce very high name agreement; thus, words having
currently used synonyms–e.g., “macchina”, “auto” “automobile”
(car) were excluded.
Norms Collection
The 35 selected cue words were administered to a sample of
52 healthy elderly subjects to quantify the relevant associative
indices. Fifty-two different pseudo randomizations were carried
out to present the 35 cue words in a different order to each subject
and to avoid that words belonging to the same superordinate
category occupied adjacent positions. Norms were collected
individually using the same procedure adopted for the pilot study
(see section Item Selection): the experimenter read the cue aloud
and recorded the response; the subjects were instructed to say the
first word that came to mind as fast as possible.
The collected data were used to compute the FSG between
each cue-associate pair and the AAG of each single cue word
using the H metric. The 35-cue word set with corresponding
H-index AAG is reported in Appendix.
Seventeen of the 35 words in our corpus were also contained
in Fernandez et al.’s (2004) norms. As cue words, this corpus
contains the stimuli originally comprised in the normative
data by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980); thus, the norms of
Fernandez and colleagues, like ours, were collected on concrete
words referring to depictable objects. Based on these analogies,
we used the norms of Fernandez to tentatively compare the
distribution of AAG in our corpus (selected so as to contain
words with a relatively high level of AAG) with a large corpus
of unselected concrete words. To this aim, we computed the
H-index of AAG for all words comprised in Fernandez et al.’s
(2004) norms and compared the distribution of AAG in the
17 words shared by the two corpora with the distribution of
this variable in Fernandez et al.’s entire corpus. The mean H-
index of the 17 words also included in our corpus was 3.6
(SD = 0.94, range 1.8–5.3); the mean of the same parameter
computed on the whole corpus was = 4.6, SD = 0.92, and the
range was 1.8–6.4. Considering that low levels of H indicate high
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agreement, we can say that our words spanned a large range ofH-
values but on average showed a relatively high AAG. In fact, the
average H-index of the 17 words shared by the two corpora was
significantly lower than that of Fernandez et al.’s whole corpus
(t = 4.798, df = 16, p < 0.001). A direct comparison of the H-
index computed on the two normative corpora was precluded by
the fact that the number of participants was about 10 times higher
in the norms of Fernandez; thus, idiosyncratic responses were
more frequent in those norms and H-values were consequently
higher. Consider that the H-index can range from 0 (maximum
agreement) to infinity (maximum dispersion) and that its value
increases with the increasing number of different responses given
by the normative sample. Interestingly, however, the 18 (i.e., 35
min 17) words comprised in our corpus, which were not present
in that of Fernandez, showed an average H computed on our
norms which was very similar to that of the 17 words shared
by both corpora. Thus, the considerations we made about the
17 common items can likely be extended to the entire 35-word
corpus.
Experimental Investigation
Subjects
Three subject samples were submitted to the experimental
investigations described next. The first sample, comprising 33
female and 30 male healthy adult subjects, carried out the written
word definition task (mean age = 37.7, SD = 15.12; mean
years of education = 14.6, SD = 2.99). A group of subjects
suffering from AD and their matched controls participated in
the picture naming and the free association task. The AD sample
comprised 10 subjects attending the Brain Aging and Alzheimer’s
Disease unit of the IRCCS Santa Lucia Foundation in Rome.
All of them met the revised clinical criteria established by the
National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders
and Stroke-Association for probable AD (McKhann et al., 2011).
Their medical history, neurological examination, brain imaging
and laboratory tests provided assurance that their dementia
symptoms could not be attributed to an illness other than AD.
The control sample comprised 10 healthy, age and education
matched subjects (NC). Demographic characteristics of the AD
and NC samples and age and education adjusted scores on the
Mini-Mental State Examination (Measso et al., 1993) are reported
in Table 1. Age and years of education were not significantly
different across groups (F, consistently <1) but, as expected,
NC outperformed AD significantly on the Mini-Mental State
Examination [F(1, 18) = 46.6, p < 0.001].
The protocol of this study was approved by the Independent
Ethic Committee of the Santa Lucia Foundation (Comitato
Etico Indipendente dell’IRCCS Fondazione Santa Lucia). All
subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Tasks
Written word definition
The 35 cue words comprised in the free association task were
administered to a group of 63 healthy subjects (see above) in a
written definition task. The words to be defined were printed
in a booklet of A4 sheets of paper, six to a page with two
TABLE 1 | Demographic characteristics and MMSE scores of the experimental
sample.
Group Sex (F/M) Age Education MMSE
AD 8/2 75.4 (6.60) 11.5 (4.14) 20.15 (3.64)
NC 7/3 74.7 (8.43) 12.3 (3.86) 28.65 (1.51)
Sex frequencies, mean (standard deviation) for Age and Education level (expressed in
years) and mean adjusted MMSE scores are reported for the different experimental
groups.
empty lines underneath. Ten different pseudo randomisations
of the 35-word list were carried out with the same criteria used
to collect the associative norms (see section Norms Collection)
On the first page of the booklet the following instructions
were printed: “write a brief definition (1–2 sentences) of the
following words”. Booklets were given to the subjects who
performed the task at home and returned it several days
later.
Responses were scored according to the cue/associate pairs
generated by the normative sample. A score was attributed to
each cue/associate pair (e.g., camel/desert) that expressed the
proportion of subjects who used the associate word to define the
cue word. Thus, for example, the camel/desert pair received a
score of 0.57 because 36 out of 63 subjects used “desert” to define
“camel.”
Picture naming
This task and the one described in the next section were
administered to the 10 AD subjects and their controls. Each
subject carried out the two tasks in the same session in fixed
order, beginning with the free association task and ending
with the picture naming task. The pictures included in the
naming task were the same 35 items referred to by the cue
words in the free-association task plus another 35 concrete
objects. Items not included in the association tasks were added
with a double purpose: (i) to increase the statistical power
of between groups comparisons, (ii) to mask the relationship
between the free association and the naming task. We selected
70 colored photographs from the Internet to construct this task.
Photographs depicted typical exemplars of the items to be named
in a canonical view. Care was taken to select photographs with
neutral backgrounds i.e., devoid of information relevant to the
identity of the object to be named. Responses were scored as
either correct or incorrect.
Free association task
Materials and procedure were the same as those adopted for
collecting the normative data and already described in section
Norms Collection. The scoring procedure was as follows: each
response given by either an AD or a control subject was scored
according to the FSG obtained in our norms, i.e., according to
the proportion of subjects who gave the same response in the
original normative task; e.g., the response “deserto” (desert) to
the cue “cammello” (camel) was scored 0.27 because 14 out of the
52 subjects enrolled in the normative task responded this way. If a
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subject produced a response never given by the normative sample
a score of 0 was given.
Analyses
Each of the three above-described experiments was aimed at
providing support for a different prediction of our hypothesis
regarding the semantic nature of associative links. The outcomes
of the experimental tasks were submitted to a series of descriptive
and inferential analyses. For each experiment we will describe
next only those analyses considered critical for verifying the
corresponding prediction. As for the written word definition
task, the prediction to be confirmed was that of a relationship
between FSG and usefulness of a given associate in defining the
meaning of the corresponding cue word. To verify this, a Pearson
correlation analysis was conducted between the FSG of the
associated words that resulted from the norms collection (Section
Norms Collection) and the frequency of occurrence of those
same words in the definitions of the cue words. A significant
correlation is the expected output based on our prediction. As
for the picture naming task, the prediction to be confirmed was
that of a predictive role of AAG on the naming accuracy of
the AD group. To confirm this prediction, a logistic regression
was carried out which had the naming responses of the AD
subjects (coded as a dummy variable: 0 = wrong, 1 = correct)
as dependent variable and AAG and word frequency (Bertinetto
et al., 2005) of the to be named word as predictors. A significant
contribution of AAG over and above a possible role of word
frequency in predicting naming accuracy is considered to be in
keeping with our prediction. Finally, as for the free association
task we expected altered FSG in AD subjects as compared to
NC. To verify this, we adopted a mixed model approach to
demonstrate a group effect (AD vs. NC) over and above the
predictive role of Subject and Word entered as random factors.
RESULTS
Written Word Definition
As stated at the end of the introduction, the hypothesis of the
semantic nature of associative links predicts that the FSG between
a word pair should predict the frequency of occurrence of the
associated word in the definition of the cue word. To verify this
prediction we analyzed the output of our word definition task and
searched for a relationship between the probability of producing
a given word as a free associate to a given cue and the probability
of producing the same word in the context of a written definition
of the meaning of the cue word.
Overall the normative sample produced 165 different, non-
idiosyncratic (i.e., produced by at least two subjects) associates on
the free association task. Across these 165 items, we performed
Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the proportion of
subjects who produced a given item as a free associate and the
proportion of subjects who produced the same item in the word
definition task (throughout the paper, the Boostrap method was
used to derive CI for correlations). This correlation (see Figure 1)
turned out to be highly significant, r = 0.45, p < 0.001, 95%
CI: 0.315–0.570, observed power (1-β) = 0.999. This result lends
support to the hypothesis that subjects rely on their semantic
FIGURE 1 | Scatterplot and last squares line showing the correlation between
cue-associate FSG and proportion of subjects using the associate for defining
the cue meaning.
representations in performing both tasks. It should be noted that
the 52 healthy subjects in the normative data collection sample
(see section Norms Collection) were older than the 63 subjects
who performed the word definition task. Although this difference
cannot be considered a serious confound (because noise resulting
from the unmatched subject sample could only have loosened
the critical correlation between our variables of interest not the
opposite), we attempted to confirm this result by substituting
the values obtained from the unmatched 52 subjects sample with
those obtained from the 20 younger normal subjects enrolled
in the pilot study (see section Subjects). This time age was
comparable across groups [F(1, 81) = 1.7, p= 0.189] As expected,
the correlation between FSG and the reviewed values of AAG
was still significant: r = 0.48, p < 0.001, 95% CI: 0.356–0.610,
observed power (1-β)= 0.999.
Picture Naming
Our picture naming test comprised 70 items, 35 of which
depicted items also comprised in the free-association and the
written word definition task. As stated above (see section Item
Selection), these items were selected to minimize the likelihood
that correct unexpected answers would be produced in picture
naming. To this end, words with currently used synonyms were
excluded. Results of our naming task were in keeping with our
expectations: only 5 and 4% of the correct naming responses
given by the AD and NC subjects respectively did not coincide
with the expected response. This value was considerably higher,
i.e., 13%, for the 35 unselected items in the naming task.
In the first analysis we wanted to verify whether our AD
sample exhibited a naming impairment as compared to its
matched control group. To this aim we compared naming
accuracy on the corpus of 70 items across groups. As expected,
NCs outperformed ADs. The mean number of correct responses
(and SD) was 48.2 (13.9) and 66.5 (2.8) in the AD and the
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FIGURE 2 | Group performance in the picture naming task (above) and in the
Free association task (below). On the Y axis number of correctly named items
and mean FSG are reported for the naming and free association task
respectively. As can be seen, higher naming performance in the NC group is
associated with the production of associates with higher FSG.
NC group, respectively (see Figure 2). AS the variance of the
dependent variable was not equal across groups, a nonparametric
analysis was carried out using the Mann-Whitney U-test. The
cross-group difference in naming accuracy was statistically
significant (U= 1, N1 = 10, N2 = 10; p < 0.001, two-tailed).
More interesting for our purposes was the investigation of the
role of AAG in predicting the naming performance of the AD
group. To this end we carried out a logistic regression analysis
by entering as dependent variable each single naming response
given by AD subjects coded as a binary variable (0 = wrong, 1
= correct) and as predictors we again entered word frequency
and AAG (H-index) of the word to be produced. The full model
significantly predicted naming accuracy (omnibus chi-square =
18.445, df = 2, p < 0.001) with both independent variables
reliably predicting naming output: H-index, B = −0.469, Wald
= 8.356, p = 0.004; word frequency, B = 0.012, Wald = 8.540,
p= 0.003. Observed power (1-β) for frequency and H-index was
0.785 and 0.881, respectively. As the sign of the B coefficients
revealed, words with high frequency and high AAG (i.e., low
H-index values) were named better. It is widely agreed (see
discussion) that word frequency predicts ease of processing at
the lexical level; therefore, the fact that AAG reliably predicts
naming accuracy while controlling for word frequency suggests
that the two variables act at different processing levels. This
impression is further confirmed by the lack of any significant
correlation between the H-index and word frequency (r = 0.121,
p = n.s.); if both were indices of ease of lexical processing, we
should have found a correlation between them. In a further
attempt to take apart the locus of word frequency and the AAG
effect, we analyzed both variables as a function of error type. In
particular, we performed two independent univarate ANOVAs to
ascertain which kinds of errors showed a significantly different
level of frequency/AAG as compared to the correct responses.
Responses were categorized as correct responses (n = 247),
semantic errors (n = 31; this category included coordinate
errors—e.g., “horse” for “camel”—and superordinate errors-e.g.,
“transportation” for “sledge”), anomic errors (i.e., omissions, n
= 45) and other errors (n = 27) including circumlocutions
(e.g., “house for bees” for “hive”), non-correlated responses
(e.g., “colors” for “puzzle”) and visual errors (e.g., “ball” for
“olive”). Both H-index [F(3, 346) = 3.2, p = 0.025] and frequency
[F(3, 346) = 4.2, p= 0.006] varied significantly across the different
response types. More interestingly, concerning the H-index only
semantic errors were characterized by a significantly different
H-index compared to correct responses (correct responses =
2.35, semantic errors = 2.7, LSD test, p = 0.015). Importantly,
items yielding semantic errors showed lower levels of AAG (i.e.,
higher values of H-index) compared to items yielding correct
responses. Regarding word frequency, significant comparisons
involved anomic errors (correct responses = 37.50 vs. anomic
errors = 25.11, LSD test, p = 0.027) and other errors (correct
responses = 37.50 vs. other errors = 16.52, LSD test, p = 0.003)
whereas the frequency of words yielding semantic errors did
not differ significantly from the frequency of words yielding
correct responses. Also in this case, differences across response
types were in the expected direction, i.e., lower frequency
for incorrectly named words. We interpret these findings as
suggesting that the two psycholinguistic variables have different
action levels (see Discussion).
Free Association Task
The mean FSG (and SD) of the associated words produced
by AD and NC participants was 0.25 (0.065) and 0.35 (0.071),
respectively (see Figure 2). We were interested in demonstrating
that this difference was statistically reliable taking into account
the potential effect of inter-subject and inter-item uncontrolled
variability. To this end the data obtained in the free association
tasks were analyzed with a mixed effects model approach. FSG
of any particular cue/associate pair produced by any particular
participant was entered as dependent variable, Group (AD vs.
NC) and H-index were entered as fixed factors and Subject (i.e.,
participant 1–20) and test Item (i.e., word 1–35) were entered as
random factors. Although the effect of AAG was not relevant to
verify our prediction (i.e., altered FSG in the AD group), entering
H-index in the model was warranted because the 35 cue words
were selected in order to span a wide range of AAG values and it
is expected that AAG of a cue affects FSG of its associated (see
equation in section Measures). Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) indicated that removing the Item random factor increased
the model fit (BIC = 12.5 and 6.0 with and without the Item
factor respectively). Thus, the simpler model will be described
next. Both the Group [F(1, 245) = 7, p = 0.009] and the H-index
[F(1, 637) = 385, p < 0.001] effects turned out to reliably predict
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FSG whereas the Group by H-index interaction did not reach
statistical significance [F(1, 637) = 1.9, p= 0.159]. Subject entered
as random effect also contributed to the model fit (Z = 2.033;
p= 0.042).
This results confirm the prediction that FSG is altered in
the AD group. In particular, FSG appear to be reduced in the
pathological population. Furthermore, the lack of a significant
Group by H-Index interaction suggests that this reduction is
comparable across words spanning a large range of AAG values.
In order to be sure that the observed cross groups difference
in FSG was not due to the well-known trend in AD subjects to
produce high frequency words (Cuetos et al., 2012), in another
item analysis we compared the mean production frequency
(Bertinetto et al., 2005) of the associates across groups. The mean
frequency (number of occurrences per 3 million) of the associates
produced for the 35 cue words was comparable in the AD group
(mean 302.2, SD = 227.3) and the NC group (mean = 339.6,
SD = 542.9), t = 0.469, df = 34, p = n.s. This result rules out
the possibility that the FSG effect was the epiphenomenon of a
Frequency effect.
DISCUSSION
The present work is an attempt to provide empirical support
for the hypothesis that the relationships between a cue word
and its free associates are semantic in nature. This counters the
prevailing view that associative links reveal lexical relationships
between words. To do this we devised two experiments involving
semantic tasks and investigated the effects of word association
indices on the performance of healthy participants and AD
subjects who are supposed to suffer from a disruption of semantic
knowledge. The first experiment consisted of a word definition
task that was carried out by cognitively intact individuals. The
second experiment consisted of a picture naming task that
was performed by a sample of AD subjects and their normal
controls. Finally, in a third experiment, involving AD subjects,
we investigated the effect of impaired semantic memory in a free
association task.
The three experiments provided results that consistently
support the semantic nature of associative links.
The evidence gathered from the first experiment regards
the relationship between FSG of a cue/associate pair and the
proportion of healthy subjects who use that associate to define
the meaning of the cue word. We found that the proportion
of subjects who use word X to define word Y increases with
increasing FSG between word Y (cue) and word X (associate). In
our view this strongly suggests that FSG captures the usefulness of
word X in defining word Y.Moreover, it is likely that words which
are more useful in defining a given meaning carry important bits
of semantic information about that meaning. Thus, FSG likely
expresses the semantic relevance of the associates for themeaning
of the cue word. This clearly hints at the semantic nature of
associative links.
The main finding of the second experiment regards the
predictive role of AAG in the naming ability of individuals with
AD. Assuming that people with AD fail on naming tasks because
of their disrupted semantic memory, the finding of a relationship
between AAG and naming performance in this population argues
strongly in favor of the semantic nature of associative links.
Regarding the mechanisms through which AAG might influence
naming performance, we argue as follows: Words with high AAG
elicit only few associates in a normative subject sample. In our
view, (non-idiosyncratic) associates represent pieces of semantic
information (i.e., semantic features); thus, if most subjects select
the same few associates for a given cue word, thismeans that there
is high agreement about the most useful features for describing
the meaning of that word. Thus, high AAG entails high semantic
agreement and meanings upon which subjects strongly agree are
likely to be more resilient against the pathological disruption of
conceptual knowledge that occurs in AD. Although there are
many hints of the semantic nature of naming errors in AD1,
some authors have argued that there is also a lexical deficit in
AD (Cuetos et al., 2012). Thus, the effect of a putative lexical
impairment on the naming performance of our AD sample
cannot be definitely ruled out. Therefore, at variance with our
view one could hypothesize that AAG captures some lexical
characteristics of the cue word and exerts its effect on AD
naming through mechanisms different from the semantic one we
proposed above. There are two related findings, however, which
in our opinion run counter to this possibility. First, in the word
sample included in our experiment, AAG did not correlate with
word frequency and, second, AAG predicts naming accuracy
over and above the effect of word frequency. Because this latter
index is considered to be firmly associated with the lexical, post
semantic step of word production (see Nozari et al., 2010 for an
in-depth discussion of functional locus of the frequency effect)
based on the assumption that AAG also measures the ease of
lexical processing of a given word, we should expect some degree
of correlation between word frequency and AAG. Similarly,
assuming that both AAG and word frequency exert their effect
at the lexical level of processing, an independent contribution
of both variables in predicting naming accuracy would not be
expected. Further evidence arguing in favor of a semantic locus
of the AAG effect on AD naming performance was obtained by
taking error type into account. In the AD sample AAG turned out
to be significantly lower in items that give rise to semantic naming
errors than in items that generated correct responses. By contrast,
no significant differences in AAG levels were found when correct
responses were compared with anomic errors or other errors. By
contrast, low word frequency characterized anomic errors and
other errors as compared to correct responses, while words giving
rise to semantic errors did not show lower frequency as compared
to correctly named words. The finding that the two variables are
associated with different errors types clearly suggests that they act
at different functional loci. More importantly for our purposes,
1Although a review of the literature on this topic is beyond the scope of this study,
we would like to mention two of the most often reported findings supporting this
argument. First, AD patients fail on the same items they are unable to name across
a range of different semantic tasks that do not require naming responses (Salmon
et al., 1999, p. 110). Second, as compared to elderly controls, the qualitative analysis
of naming errors in AD revealed a preponderance of superordinate and semantic
associative errors (indicating a semantic genesis) and a scarcity of circumlocutory
responses (indicating lexical damage) (Hodges et al., 1991, p.1555).
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the error type reliably associated with AAG (i.e., coordinate and
superordinate errors) “has been taken as (...) evidence that one
of the major cognitive impairments suffered by AD patients is a
disintegration of their conceptual semantic system” (Cuetos et al.,
2012, p.245).
The main result of the last experiment of the present study
was that FSG is reduced in AD; i.e., subjects with AD are less
consistent than NCs in producing associates to a given cue. As
we indicated above, the assumption of a pure semantic deficit
in AD is not universally agreed upon and thus the finding
of reduced FSG in this population cannot be unequivocally
interpreted because it could arise from the loosening of links
between semantic features (according to the hypothesis of the
semantic nature of associative links) as well as from disruption
at the lexical processing level (in keeping with the alternative
hypothesis of the lexical nature of associative links).
Nevertheless, a secondary finding of the same experiment
counters the alternative lexical hypothesis. Indeed, the AD
subjects produced associated words in our free association task
with virtually the same frequency as NCs. On the assumption that
FSG is altered in AD due to a lexical impairment, we should have
found increased word frequency of associated words produced
by AD because high frequency words are easier to process at this
functional level.
There is wide agreement among neuropsychologists that
associative links are lexical and non-semantic in nature because
they rely on the co-occurrence of words in texts. In fact,
this conclusion rests on the assumption that co-occurrence
patterns of words in text cannot contribute to the definition of
concept boundaries (because concepts exist independently from
the lexical labels that refer to them). Sustainers of the non-
semantic nature of word associations are right in affirming a
relationship between the distribution of words in printed and
spoken text and associative links. This relationship is in fact
demonstrated by the “correlation between associative strength
and co-occurrence of words in large language corpora” (Moss
et al., 1995, p. 864). However, starting from other premises, the
finding of this correlation favors the opposite conclusion, i.e., that
associative links are semantic in nature because semantics rely
on the relations between words in text. There is wide agreement
regarding this latter point of view outside the neuropsychological
tradition. In linguistics, for example, the “contextual approach”
to semantics assumes that “the semantic properties of a lexical
item are fully reflected in appropriate aspects of the relations it
contracts with actual and potential contexts” (Cruse, 1986, p.1).
Psycholinguistic approaches based on statistical computations
applied to large text corpora also share the common tenet that
meanings arise from relationships between words (e.g., see the
Latent Semantic Analysis approach, Landauer et al., 1998, see
Bruni et al., 2014 for recent developments in this approach).
Interestingly, in order to prove their semantic relevance,
sustainers of statistical measures have successfully used these
variables to predict priming effects (see for example Jones et al.,
2006) as well as other purported semantic phenomena in humans
(e.g., synonym judgment, Landauer et al., 1998). Noteworthy, as
we mention in the Introduction, priming effects have also been
interpreted as arising frommore shallow relations between prime
and target, namely, lexical ones. In fact, if we admit, in keeping
with Fodor (1983), that relations between words can mimic
relations between things in the world, it becomes impossible to
argue in favor of the truly semantic nature of word relations from
their ability to predict human performance on semantic tasks.
What Fodor said about associative links could also apply to any
kind of statistical relationship between words: they simply “are
the means whereby stupid processing systems manage to behave
as though they were smart ones” that is, as if they were handling
semantic information (1983, p. 81).
The interpretation of the evidence provided by the present
work suffers from the same ambiguity: apart from the potential
confound of a putative lexical deficit in AD subjects, it is
impossible to definitely rule out that associative links simply
mimic, at the lexical level, semantic relations which hold in a
“smarter” amodal or embodied system.
Nevertheless, the present results represent a case for language
oriented approaches in so far as they easily and straightforwardly
fit the predictions of a hypothesis (i.e., the semantic nature
of associative links) which gives language a fundamental role
in constraining the organization of conceptual knowledge in
humans. In fact, summarizing our results we can say that for
several reasons the semantic hypothesis of associative links
seems preferable to the alternative lexical hypothesis. First, it
is more parsimonious because it can account for the results of
all of our experiments, whereas the alternative explanation is
unsuited to account for the findings of experiment 1. Second,
the semantic hypothesis provides a principled account of the
results of experiment 2, particularly concerning the pattern of
modulatory effects different error types exert on the action
of AAG and word frequency on naming accuracy. Third, the
independence of AAG and word frequency (a variable exerting
its effect at the lexical level) that emerged from the findings
of experiments two and three suggests that the two variables
influence different cognitive processes.
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APPENDIX
CUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION H-INDEX
OF AAG
ALVEARE HIVE 1.05
CAMMELLO∗ CAMEL 2.95
CANGURO∗ KANGAROO 3.03
CARROZZA CARRIAGE 1.87
CLESSIDRA HOURGLASS 1.85
COMPASSO COMPASSES 2.88
DITALE∗ THIMBLE 2.20
ELICOTTERO∗ HELICOPTER 3.57
FRIGORIFERO∗ REFRIGERATOR 3.30
GHIANDA ACORN 2.49
GIRAFFA∗ GIRAFFE 3.10
INCENSO INCENSE 2.88
INTERRUTTORE∗ SWITCH 2.05
LATTINA CAN 3.04
OCCHIALI GLASSES 1.88
OLIVA OLIVE 1.81
OMBRELLO∗ UMBRELLA 1.11
PECORA∗ SHEEP 3.48
PETTINE∗ COMB 1.45
POLPO OCTOPUS 2.73
POMODORO∗ TOMATO 3.45
PORTAFOGLIO WALLET 1.73
PUZZLE PUZZLE 3.45
RAGNO∗ SPIDER 2.52
RINOCERONTE∗ RHINOCEROS 2.91
RUBINETTO FAUCET 1.18
SERRATURA LOCK 1.77
SIGARETTA CIGARETTE 1.69
SLITTA∗ SLED 2.65
TAZZA∗ CUP 2.92
TERMOMETRO THERMOMETER 1.49
VALIGIA∗ SUITCASE 2.86
VAMPIRO VAMPIRE 3.71
VASO∗ VASE 1.18
VULCANO VOLCANO 2.93
∗Word present in Fernandez et al. (2004).
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